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Summary
Many border security initiatives were developed after the events of September
11, 2001.  Because security initiatives often maintain a search and seizure
component, Fourth Amendment implications may arise.  The Fourth Amendment
establishes that a search or seizure conducted by a governmental agent must be
reasonable, and that probable cause support any judicially granted warrant.  An
invalid “search” is an infringement of an expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to consider reasonable.  A “seizure” of a person occurs when a government
official makes an individual reasonably believe that he or she is not at liberty to
ignore the government’s presence in view of all the circumstances surrounding the
incident.  The Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to include a presumptive
warrant requirement on all searches and seizures conducted by the government, and
has ruled that any violations of this standard will result in the suppression of any
information derived therefrom.  The Court, however, has also recognized situations
that render the obtainment of a warrant impractical or against the public’s interest,
and has accordingly crafted various exceptions to the warrant and probable cause
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  
Few exceptions to the presumptive warrant and probable cause requirements are
more firmly rooted than the “border search” exception.  Pursuant to the right of the
United States to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property
crossing into the country, routine border searches are reasonable simply by virtue of
the fact that they occur at the border.  Courts have recognized two different legal
concepts for authorizing border searches away from the actual physical border: (1)
searches at the functional equivalent of the border; and (2) extended border searches.
Courts have determined that border searches usually fall into two categories —
routine and nonroutine.  Generally, the distinction between “routine” and
“nonroutine” turns on the level of intrusiveness.  Routine border searches are usually
very limited intrusions into a person’s privacy and require no suspicion of illegal
activity to be upheld by a court.  Nonroutine border searches must generally be
supported by “reasonable suspicion” and can include destructive searches of
inanimate objects, prolonged detentions, strip searches, body cavity searches, and x-
ray searches. 
This report addresses the scope of the government’s authority to search and
seize individuals at the border pursuant to the constitutional framework that
encompasses the border search exception to the warrant and probable cause
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  This report also describes the varying levels
of suspicion generally associated with each type of border search as interpreted by
the courts.  In addition, this report highlights some of the border security
recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission, legislative actions taken in the
108th and 109th Congress, and features of the “Minuteman Project.”  This report does
not address interior searches and seizures performed by immigration personnel since
they are not traditional “border searches” in the Court’s view.  This report will be
updated as warranted.
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in preventing entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international
border.”); United States v. Teng Yang, 286 F.3d 940, 944 n.1 (7th Cir. 2002); Bradley v.
United States, 299 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2002); Chen Yun Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266,
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Protecting our Perimeter: “Border Searches”
under the Fourth Amendment
Introduction
United States border policy has reflected a longstanding goal of balancing
legitimate cross-border commerce and travel with the right of the sovereign to protect
itself from terrorist activities, illegal immigrants, and contraband.  After the events
of September 11, 2001, border security received considerable attention from the
White House and the Congress and many new security initiatives were developed.
Indeed, many of the border security recommendations and observations made in the
9/11 Commission Report saw significant congressional action in the 108th Congress
and dialogue has already continued in the 109th.  
The judiciary has noted that the events of September 11 emphasized a
heightened  need for more thorough security and inspections at our borders.1  Security
initiatives, however, often contain a search and seizure component that implicate
Fourth Amendment protections.  The Fourth Amendment establishes that a search or
seizure conducted by a governmental agent must be reasonable, and that probable
cause support any judicially granted warrant.  Although the Supreme Court has
interpreted this language as imposing a presumptive warrant requirement on all
searches and seizures conducted by governmental authority, the Court has recognized
exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.  Few exceptions to the usual Fourth Amendment requirements are more
firmly rooted in the history of the United States than the “border search” exception.
Pursuant to the right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining
persons and property crossing into the country, routine border searches are reasonable
simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.  Border searches are another
tool that government officials may use to combat terrorism.  
Routine searches are usually very limited intrusions into a person’s privacy,
generally consist of a patdown, the emptying of pockets, or a vehicle inspection, and
do not require suspicion of criminal activity to be conducted.  Upon a “reasonable
suspicion” of smuggling or other illegal activity, government officials may generally
conduct a nonroutine border search.  Nonroutine searches may include destructive
searches of inanimate objects, prolonged detentions, strip searches, body cavity
searches, and x-ray searches.  Although there is support to require a stronger
suspicion requirement for some nonroutine border searches, courts have interpreted
CRS-2
2 U.S. Const., Amend. IV.
3 The Supreme Court has interpreted probable cause to mean “a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”  Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 238 (1983).   
4 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990) (Fourth Amendment not
applicable to search in Mexico of Mexican citizen’s home). Immigration laws have long
made a distinction between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission
and those who are within the U.S. after an entry, irrespective of its legality.  In the latter
instance, the Court has recognized additional rights and privileges not extended to those in
the former category, who are merely “on the threshold of initial entry.”  Leng May Ma v.
Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958) (articulating the “entry fiction” doctrine).
5 Katz v. United Sates, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
Supreme Court precedent as warning against the development of multiple gradations
of suspicion in the context of nonroutine border searches.
This report addresses the scope of the government’s authority to search and
seize individuals at the border pursuant to the constitutional framework that
encompasses the border search exception to the warrant and probable cause
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  Initially, this report analyzes the historical
development of the Fourth Amendment and its “border search” exception.  It then
describes the varying levels of suspicion generally associated with each type of
search as interpreted by the courts.  Finally, the report highlights some of the border
security recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission, as well as, some of the
recent border security measures taken by Congress.  Also included, is a brief
discussion on some of the legal issues posed by the newly formed “Minuteman
Project.”  Although related, this report does not address the various types of interior
searches and seizures performed by immigration personnel.  
The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”2  It establishes, in essence, that a search or seizure
conducted by a government agent must be reasonable, and that probable cause must
support any judicially granted warrant.3  In general, the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect the people of the United States against arbitrary action by
their own government, not to restrain the actions of the federal government against
aliens outside of United States territory.4 
Initially, the Supreme Court interpreted the “reasonableness” standard of the
Fourth Amendment as imposing a presumptive warrant requirement, stating that
“searches conducted outside the judicial process without prior approval by judge or
magistrate are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a
few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.”5  The Court, however,
has wavered from this approach, determining that “a warrant is not required to
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6 Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995). Interpreted literally, the
Fourth Amendment requires neither a warrant for each search or seizure, nor probable cause
to support a search or seizure. 
7 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971); see also Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1967).     
8 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539-540 (1967).
9 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-78 (1984); see also Walter v. United States,
447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (noting that a wrongful search or seizure conducted by a private
party does not violate the Fourth Amendment. . . .).
10 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648
(1961) (exclusionary rule in general). 
11 Sodal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 113 (1984).
establish the reasonableness of all government searches; and when a warrant is not
required . . . probable cause is not invariably required either.”6  Traditionally, the
warrant requirement in the criminal setting has been viewed as a protective measure,
placing the authority to issue a warrant with a “neutral and detached” judicial officer
who can assess whether the police have probable cause to make an arrest, to conduct
a search, or to seize materials.7  In instances where the interests of the public
outweigh those of private individuals, however, the Court has recognized
“specifically established exceptions” to the warrant and probable cause requirements
of the Fourth Amendment.8 
At its broadest, a Fourth Amendment analysis is a two-stage inquiry.  First, was
the action of a government officer toward a person or thing sufficiently intrusive to
constitute a “search” or “seizure?”9   Second, if a “search” or “seizure” did occur,
was the intrusion “reasonable” in light of the circumstances?  The “reasonableness”
of a particular government action is judged by balancing the governmental interest
which allegedly justifies the official intrusion against a person’s legitimate
expectations of privacy.  Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion,
the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place
in which it is conducted.  If a court determines that a government intrusion
constitutes a “search” or “seizure” that was not reasonable in light of the relative
weights of the government’s interest and a person’s constitutionally protected privacy
interests, it will conclude that a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred.  While
a violation of the Fourth Amendment may, as a general rule,  result in the suppression
of any information derived therefrom in a judicial proceeding, such a rule does not
apply to deportation proceedings.10
Seizure.  In general, seizures may be of individuals or property.  The Supreme
Court has described a seizure of property as “some meaningful interference with an
individual’s possessory interests in that property.”11  An individual is “seized” when
a government official makes a person reasonably believe that he or she is not at
liberty to ignore the government’s presence and go about his business in view of all
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12 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) citing Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567,
573 (1988). 
13 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984).
14 See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002); see also United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
15 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
16 See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (person’s clothing); Clinton v. Virginia, 377
U.S. 158 (1964) (apartment); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (automobile
interpreted as an effect).
17 See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-135 (1942) (applying a trespass equals
search analysis); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (same).
18 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  See also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) (“We
have recognized that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of
privacy rather than property, and have increasingly disregarded fictional and procedural
barriers rested on property concepts.”).
the circumstances surrounding the incident.12  Additionally, a refusal to cooperate,
without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for
a detention or seizure.13  A seizure of a person, therefore, can include full arrests,
investigatory detentions, checkpoint stops for citizenship inquiries, and detentions
of a person against his will.  The Supreme Court has identified a number of factors
that might suggest that a seizure has occurred, including (1) the intimidating presence
or movement of officers; (2) the display of weapons; (3) the application of physical
force; and (4) the authoritative tone of voice used by officers.14 
Search.  Historically, a “search” entailed some type of government invasion
into a “constitutionally protected area.”15  Early courts looked to the enumerated areas
described in the Fourth Amendment to determine what was a “constitutionally
protected area” (i.e., “persons, houses, papers, and effects”).16  These courts soon
began to emphasize  property principles in their Fourth Amendment analysis.17  Not
until the landmark decision of Katz v. United States in 1967 did the Supreme Court
abandon its structural “property” approach for a fluid constitutional framework that
was to “protect people, not places.”18 
Katz involved eavesdropping by means of an electronic surveillance device
attached to the exterior of a public telephone booth — a location not within the
enumerated constitutional protections (i.e., persons, houses, papers, and effects).  The
lower courts concluded that no search took place since the electronic surveillance
device did not penetrate the wall of the telephone booth.  The Supreme Court,
however, stepped away from its historical  property principles and proclaimed that
the reach of the Fourth Amendment could not turn upon the presence or absence of
a physical intrusion into a given enclosure.  Although the majority in Katz
demonstrated a new understanding of the term “search,” it was Justice Harlan’s
concurring opinion that articulated the basic standard courts emphasize today.  
According to Justice Harlan’s concurrence, a “search” does not occur for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment unless (1) the individual manifested a subjective
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19 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
20 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998).
21 United States v. Elmore, 304 F.3d 557, 562 (6th Cir. 2002).
22 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
23 Id. at 37.  
24 Id. at 40.
25 Id. citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).  Accordingly, the Fourth
Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance of the home against unreasonable searches and
requires clear specification of those methods of surveillance that require a warrant.   
26 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34.
expectation of privacy in the searched object and (2) society is willing to recognize
that expectation as reasonable or legitimate.19  In essence, an impermissible “search”
occurs when there is an infringement of an expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to consider reasonable.  Legitimate expectations of privacy must have a
source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or
personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by
society.20  Among the factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in addition to the proprietary or possessory
interest in the place to be searched, are (1) whether the defendant has the right to
exclude others from the place in question; (2) whether he has exhibited a subjective
expectation that the area would remain free from governmental intrusion; and (3)
whether he was legitimately on the premises.21     
In an effort to detect and search increasingly sophisticated smugglers, officials
today have begun to rely more heavily on advanced technologies that seemingly
intrude into our daily lives, often without our knowledge.  The use of such devices
may blur the line between expectations of privacy that are legitimate and those that
are not.  The Supreme Court addressed this issue  in Kyllo v. United States when it
considered the constitutional limits upon the government’s use of sensory-enhancing
technology.22  The Kyllo Court determined that the use of a thermal-imaging device
to detect heat waves emitted from a home was a “search” partly because all details
in the home are intimate (i.e., a person has a subjective and reasonable expectation
of privacy in the interior of his home).23  As a result, the  Court held that where the
government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the
home or a “constitutionally protected area” that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a “search” and is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.24  The Court felt that the Fourth
Amendment was to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable
search and seizure when it was adopted,25  but nonetheless, opined that it would “be
foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”26
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27 Act of July 31, 1789, ch.5 §§23-24, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (current version at 19 U.S.C. §§482,
1582).
28 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3).
29 See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616.  It should be noted that many of nation’s border security
agencies or functions have been transferred to the newly created Department of Homeland
Security.  See P.L. 107-296. For purposes of consistency, this report refers to agency names
as maintained in the case law.
30 Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d 317, 324 (5th Cir. 1965).
31 For a more thorough explanation on the distinctions between routine and nonroutine
searches see page 9, Types of Searches and Seizures at the Border.
32 See Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (inbound international mail); United States v. Ezeiruaku, 936
F.2d 136 (3d. Cir. 1991) (routine searches of outbound materials).  The 5th Circuit has found
the search of outbound materials permissible when: (1) the outbound search is at the border
or its functional equivalent; (2) Customs agents have reasonable suspicion that a particular
traveler will imminently engage in the felonious transportation of specific contraband in
foreign commerce; and (3) the search is relatively unintrusive and only of the area where the
contraband is allegedly secreted.  United States v. Roberts, 274 F.3d 1007, 1014 (5th Cir.
(continued...)
Border Searches
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
unless a court determines that the search is subject to an established  exception.  The
border search, although a warrantless search in general, is among the more well-
recognized and long established exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s probable
cause and warrant requirements.  Authorized by the First Congress,27 the border
search exception has a history as old as the Fourth Amendment and obtains its broad
power from Congress’s authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and to
enforce immigration laws.28  The Fourth Amendment does not require warrants or
probable cause for routine stops and searches at the border because it is within the
power of the federal government to protect itself by inspecting persons and property
entering and leaving the country.29  
Although the border search is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
and probable cause requirements, it is not exempt from the Fourth Amendment’s
“reasonableness” standard because a “search” has still occurred (i.e., the
government’s search is still subject to the balancing scale).30  Courts have determined
that border searches usually fall into two categories — routine and nonroutine.
Generally, the distinction between “routine” and “nonroutine” turns on the level of
intrusiveness.  Routine border searches are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact
that they occur at the border and consist of only a limited intrusion, while nonroutine
searches generally require reasonable suspicion and vary in technique and
intrusiveness.31  Border searches may occur when entry is made by land from the
neighboring countries of Mexico or Canada, at the place where a ship docks in the
U.S. after having been to a foreign port, and at any airport in the country where
international flights first land.  In general, authorities at the border may search a
person entering or leaving the country, an individual’s automobile, baggage, or




33 Thirty-First Annual Review of Criminal Procedure; Border Searches, 90 Geo. L.J. 1087,
1190 (2002). 
34 See United States v. Hill, 939 F.2d 934, 936 (11th Cir. 1991).
35 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973).
36 “Reasonable certainty” in this context has been defined as a standard which requires more
than probable cause, but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v.
Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1148 (5th Cir. 1993); see, e.g.,United States v. Delgado, 810 F.2d
480, 482 (5th Cir. 1987).  In Delgado, smugglers used a foot-bridge to transfer narcotics to
delivery trucks on a farm near El Paso, Texas.  The court upheld an extended border search
conducted on a farm road near and leading from the border but otherwise away from the
official border checkpoint. 
37 United States v. Teng Yang, 286 F.3d. 940, 946 (7th Cir. 2002).
Functional Equivalent.  Border searches may also be conducted within the
interior of the United States.  The border search exception extends to those searches
conducted at the “functional equivalent” of the border.  The “functional equivalent”
of a border is generally the first practical detention point after a border crossing or
the final port of entry.33  It is justified because in essence, it is no different than a
search conducted at the border and occurs only because of the impossibility of
requiring the subject searched to stop at the physical border.  A search occurs at the
border’s functional equivalent when: (1) a reasonable certainty exists that the person
or thing crossed the border; (2) a reasonable certainty exists that there was no change
in the object of the search since it crossed the border; and (3) the search was
conducted as soon as practicable after the border crossing.34  Places such as
international airports within the country and ports within the country’s territorial
waters or stations at the intersection of two or more roads extending from the border
exemplify such functional equivalents.35  In general, courts have given the “border”
a geographically flexible reading because of the significant difficulties in detecting
the increasingly mobile smuggler.  
Extended Border Search.  The border search exception may be extended
to allow warrantless searches beyond the border or its functional equivalent.  Under
the “extended border search” doctrine, government officials may conduct a
warrantless search beyond the border or its functional equivalent if (1) the
government officials have reasonable certainty or a “high degree of probability” that
a border was crossed; (2) they also have reasonable certainty that no change in the
object of the search has occurred between the time of the border crossing and the
search; and (3) they have “reasonable suspicion” that criminal activity was
occurring.36  This three-part test ensures that a suspect still has a significant nexus
with a border crossing so that border officials can reasonably base their search on
statutory and constitutional authority and to ensure that the search is reasonable.37 
Although a search at the border’s functional equivalent and an extended border
search require similar elements, the extended border search entails a greater intrusion
on a legitimate expectation of privacy, and thus, requires a showing of “reasonable
suspicion” of criminal activity.  Another difference between the functional equivalent
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38 United States v. Niver, 689 F.2d 520, 526 (5th Cir. 1982).
39 286 F.3d. 940 (7th Cir. 2002).
40 Id. at 947.
41 See, e.g., Teng Yang, 286 F.3d. 940; United States v. Espinoza-Seanez, 862 F.2d 526 (5th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Caicedo-Guarnizo, 723 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir. 1984); United States
v. Garcia, 672 F.2d 1349 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bilir, 592 F.2d 735 (4th Cir.
1979).
42 See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 592-593 (1983) (reasonable
under Fourth Amendment for Customs, acting pursuant to statutory authority, to board
vessel in domestic waters and inspect documents); see also United States v. Cilley, 785 F.2d
651, 654 (9th Cir. 1985) (reasonable under Fourth Amendment for Coast Guard to stop and
board U.S. vessel to conduct safety inspection pursuant to safety inspection laws). 
43 United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978).
44 United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1073 (5th Cir. 1980); 19 U.S.C. §1401. 
of a border search and an extended border search is that the latter takes place after the
first point in time when the entity might have been stopped within the country.38  For
example, in United States v. Teng Yang, the 7th Circuit upheld an extended border
search that occurred at an international airport but at a time after the Defendant’s
initial inspection process and at a location away from the designated U.S. border
inspection sites.39  The court determined that “[i]t is the enforcement of the customs
laws combined with the mandate of protecting the border of the United States that
permits the extension of the search rights of border authorities to allow non-routine
searches in areas near our nations’s borders.”40  Due to the dynamics of cross-border
travel, the extended border search doctrine has gained wide acceptance among the
courts because it strikes a sensible balance between the legitimate privacy interests
of the individual and society’s vital interest in the enforcement of U.S. laws.41       
At Sea.  Searches of persons and conveyances crossing our international
borders are reasonable simply because of the fact that they occur at the border.
Similar to land-based situations, the border search exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s probable cause and warrant requirements also applies to vessels
entering the territorial seas of the United States.  Government officials may board any
vessel in U.S. territorial waters or the high seas without a warrant or reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity to conduct routine document and safety inspections if
the vessel is subject to the jurisdiction or the operation of any U.S. law.42  The United
States has plenary power over its territorial seas, which generally extend three miles
from the coast,43 but may also enforce its laws up to twelve miles from the coast.44
Thus, a ship that docks at a port within the United States’ territorial waters (i.e., the
functional equivalent of the border) after arriving from a foreign country or a ship
that crosses our nation’s coastal boundaries may be subjected to a routine
suspicionless and warrantless search.       
Courts have limited such warrantless and suspicionless searches to examining
the ship’s documents, visiting the ship’s public areas, and entering a ship’s storage
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45 See Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 592 (intrusion limited to document inspection and
public areas); United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984) (Customs may
check main beam number in hold of vessel).  Public areas of the vessel include the engine
room, ice holds, and cargo holds. See, e.g., United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 255
(2d Cir 1983) (cargo holds); United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 842 (1st Cir. 1980) (engine
room); United States v. De Weese, 632 F.2d 1267, 1271 (5th Cir. 1980) (ice holds).
46 See, e.g., United States v. Roy, 869 F.2d 1427, 1430-33 (11th Cir. 1989) (limited search of
vessel based on reasonable suspicion valid, but stem-to-stern search required probable
cause).  
47 6 F.3d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 1993). The court also concluded that the recent construction,
unusual thickness of the walls, and general unkempt state of the vessel created a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.
48 Id.
49 See, e.g.,8 U.S.C. §1357(c) (authorizing immigration officials to search without a warrant
persons entering the country for evidence which may lead to the individual’s exclusion); 19
U.S.C. §1496 (authorizing customs officials to search the baggage of person entering the
country); 19 U.S.C. §1582 (authorizing customs officials to detain and search all persons
coming into the Untied States from foreign countries); see also United States v. Montoya
de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).
50  United States v. Odland, 502 F.2d 148 (7th Cir. 1974) citing Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 153 (1925). Some courts have indicated a need for “mere suspicion” to conduct
a routine border search, which usually requires at least some knowledge identifying an
individual as a suspect.  See e.g., Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. United States, 378 F.2d 256 (9th
Cir. 1967) (also using the term “unsupported suspicion”). This standard, however, is an
inaccurate articulation of the general rule that no suspicion is required.  See Odland, 502
(continued...)
compartments.45  Because there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
nonpublic areas of a ship, reasonable suspicion is required to conduct a limited search
that extends beyond document and safety inspections. Moreover, probable cause or
consent is required for full stem-to-stern searches or seizures.46  For example, in
United States v. Cardona-Sandoval, the court concluded that the captain and crew of
a small pleasure boat had a reasonable expectation of privacy in all areas of the
vessel, much like a host and overnight guests in a small apartment.47  The Cardona-
Sandoval court nevertheless validated a limited search of the vessel pursuant to the
government’s reasonable suspicion of criminal activity but invalidated a subsequent
seizure and destructive search due to the lack of probable cause.48  In general, routine
inspections of vessels entering into the U.S. may be conducted without a warrant,
probable cause, or reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, because a sovereign has
the right to protect its borders.
Types of Searches and Seizures at the Border
Routine Searches.  In order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent
the introduction of illegal aliens and contraband into this country, Congress has
granted the Executive plenary power to conduct routine searches of persons, luggage,
personal belongings, and vehicles without reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or
a warrant.49  In fact, routine searches made at the border require no suspicion and are
“reasonable” simply by the fact that they occur at the border.50  A routine border
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F.2d at 151 (“Any person or thing coming into the United States is subject to search by that
fact alone, whether or not there be any suspicion of illegality directed to the particular
person or thing to be searched.”); Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197, n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)
(stating “mere suspicion” standard effectively overruled by Montoya de Hernandez).
51 United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993).
52 See, e.g., United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that a patdown
of an international traveler’s legs was not intrusive enough to qualify as nonroutine).
53 United States v. Sandler, 644 F.2d 1163, 1169 (5th Cir. 1981).
54 United States v. Kelly, 302 F.3d 291, 294-95 (5th Cir. 2002) (sniff by a dog of a person at
the border upheld as a routine border search); cf. United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 319 F.3d
726, 730 (5th Cir. 2003) (dog sniff of a person on a bus at an immigration checkpoint upheld
and seen as analogous to a pat down).
55 United States v. Flores-Montano, 124 S. Ct. 1582 (2004) (disassembly, removal, and
reassembly of a vehicle’s fuel tank); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272
(1973); United States v. Uribe-Galindo, 990 F.2d 522, 525-526 (10th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d 663, 666 (5th Cir. 2003).
56 United States v. Julio Cortez-Rocha, 383 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2004).
57 United States v. Okafor, 285 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding an x-ray examination and
subsequent probe of luggage a routine search because it requires no force, poses no risk to
the bag’s owner or to the public, causes no psychological fear, and does not harm the
baggage).
58 Gary N. Jacobs, Note, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 Yale L.J. 1007,
1012 (1968).
59 It should be noted that the “reasonable person” test presupposes an innocent person.
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991). 
60 77 Yale L.J. 1007, 1012 (1968).
search is a search that does not pose a serious invasion of privacy or offend the
average traveler.51  For example, a routine border search may consist of limited
searches for contraband or weapons through a pat-down,52 the removal of outer
garments such as jackets, hats, or shoes, the emptying of pockets, wallets, or purses,53
the use of a drug-sniffing dog,54 some inspection of cars,55 the cutting of a spare tire,56
and some x-ray searches of inanimate objects.57  The consistent approval of routine
border searches by courts reflects a longstanding concern for the protection of the
integrity of the border.  
It has long been established that an individual’s reasonable expectation of
privacy is lower at the border than in the interior of the country.   In essence, because
a person crossing the border is on notice that a search may be likely, his privacy is
“less invaded by those searches.”58  A person crossing the border apparently has an
opportunity to decrease the amount of intrusion by limiting the nature and character
of the items which he brings with him.59  Routine border searches are also arguably
less intrusive because they are administered to a class of people (international
travelers) rather than to individuals.60  The degree of intrusiveness or invasiveness
associated with the particular technique is particularly helpful in determining whether
a search is routine.  The First Circuit, for example, compiled a nonexhaustive list of
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Garcia-Garcia, 319 F.3d 726, 730 (5th Cir. 2003) (an alert by a drug sniffing dog provided
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64 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)
(“And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion.”).
65 484 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1973).  These factors taken together matched the “smuggling
profile” for narcotic carriers in that area, and thus, the court concluded there was a sufficient
basis to conduct the search. But see Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441(1980) (rejecting the
argument that arrival from a source location could, by itself, provide reasonable suspicion).
66 See, e.g., United States v. Ramos-Saenz, 36 F.3d 59, 61 (9th Cir. 1994) (requiring the
higher “clear indication” standard for a body cavity search); United States v. Ek, 676 F.2d
379, 382 (9th Cir. 1982) (requiring a “clear indication” for x-ray search).
six factors to be considered: (1) whether the search required the suspect to disrobe
or expose any intimate body parts; (2) whether physical contact was made with the
suspect during the search; (3) whether force was used; (4) whether the type of search
exposed the suspect to pain or danger; (5) the overall manner in which the search was
conducted; and (6) whether the suspects’s reasonable expectations of privacy, if any,
were abrogated by the search.61
Nonroutine Searches.  Once a personal search by a government official goes
beyond a limited intrusion, a court may determine that a nonroutine search has
occurred.  In general, nonroutine border searches are conducted in order to detect and
search individuals who have resorted to alimentary canal smuggling.  Nonroutine
border searches may include destructive searches of inanimate objects, prolonged
detentions, strip searches, body cavity searches, and some x-ray examinations.62  At
the very least, it appears courts require a government official have a “reasonable
suspicion” of illegal activity to conduct a nonroutine border search on an individual
entering the country.63  The reasonable suspicion standard generally requires an
officer at the border to have “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
particular person” of wrongdoing.64  For example, in United States v. Forbicetta, the
court found reasonable suspicion to exist where Customs officials acted on the
following objective facts: (1) the suspect arrived from Bogota, Colombia, (2) was
traveling alone, (3) had only one suitcase and no items requiring Customs inspection,
(4) was young, clean-looking, and attractive, and (5) was wearing a loose-fitting
dress.65  Some courts, however, have required a higher degree of suspicion to justify
the more intrusive of the procedures.66  
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70 United States v. Charleus, 871 F.2d 265, 268 n.2 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Oyekan,
786 F.2d 832, 837-39 (8th Cir. 1986); Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197, 202-04 (3d
Cir. 2002). United States v. Aguebor, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 25, at *9 (4th Cir. Jan. 4, 1999)
(this unpublished opinion is cited merely as an example and is not intended to have
precedential value).  According to Professor LaFave, however, extending Montoya de
Hernandez to other nonroutine searches would require a broad reading of the case, which
doesn’t consider the fact that body cavity searches are more intrusive. See 4 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment §10.5(e), 556 (3d ed.
1996 & Supp. 2003). 
71 United States v. Okafor, 285 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding an x-ray examination and
subsequent probe of luggage a routine search).
72 124 S. Ct. 1582 (2004).
73 Flores-Montano, 124 S.Ct. at 1585; see also United States v. Cortez-Rocha, 2004 U.S.
App. LEXIS 19583 (9th Cir. Sept. 21, 2004) (no reasonable suspicion required when border
officials cut open a spare tire because the action did not affect the vehicles safety or
operation).
The Supreme Court has not articulated the level of suspicion required for the
various nonroutine border searches or the factors that render a border search routine
or nonroutine;67 however, in United States v. Montoya de Hernandez the Supreme
Court concluded that a third suspicion standard (i.e., clear indication) in addition to
“reasonable suspicion” and “probable cause” was not consistent with the Fourth
Amendment’s emphasis upon reasonableness in the prolonged detention setting.68
The Court determined that the “clear indication” standard (a suggestion that is free
from doubt) was to be used to indicate the necessity for particularized suspicion,
“rather than as enunciating a third Fourth Amendment threshold between ‘reasonable
suspicion’ and ‘probable cause.’”69 Although the Court has not articulated a level of
suspicion for all nonroutine searches, courts have viewed the Montoya de Hernandez
reasoning as a warning against the development of multiple gradations of suspicion
for nonroutine border searches in general.70       
Searches of Inanimate Objects.  A suspicionless physical or x-ray search
at the border of an inanimate object such as a person’s luggage or vehicle is generally
viewed as reasonable because it does not pose the same degree of intrusiveness as
searches of the human body.71  Furthermore, more intrusive or destructive border
searches of such inanimate objects also may not require “reasonable suspicion.”  In
United States v. Flores-Montano, the Supreme Court held that the dismantling,
removal, and reassembly of a vehicle’s fuel tank at the border was justified by the
United States’ paramount interest in protecting itself and that it did not require
reasonable suspicion.72  The Court found that the dignity and privacy interests that
require reasonable suspicion for highly intrusive searches of the person did not apply
to vehicles being examined at the border.73  The Supreme Court further articulated
that the “[c]omplex balancing tests to determine what is a ‘routine’ search of a
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76 Id. at 1587 (citing United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 1998) (drilling into body
of trailer required reasonable suspicion); United States v. Robles, 45 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1995)
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77 Flores-Montano, 124 S.Ct. at 1587.  See also United States v. Bennett, 363 F.3d 947, 951
(9th Cir. 2004) (dictum); Okafor, 285 F.3d at 846 (qualifying its holding by stating that a
suspicionless x-ray search of luggage may be done at the border “[s]o long as the means of
examination are not personally intrusive, do not significantly harm the objects scrutinized,
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78 According to Professor LaFave, Montoya de Hernandez does not stand for a “detention
until defecation” proposition. The court narrowly decided that the particular detention “was
not unreasonably long” under “these circumstances.”  In fact, the agents expected Ms. de
Hernandez to produce a bowel movement without extended delay because she had just
disembarked from a 10-hour flight.  4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on
the Fourth Amendment §10.5(b), 546 (3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2003).  
79 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541.  See also United States v. Esieke, 940 F.2d 29
(2d Cir. 1991) (court upheld a detention of one and half days before first bowel movement
and another two and half days until all balloons were expelled); United States v. Yakubu,
(continued...)
vehicle, as opposed to a more ‘intrusive’ search of a person, have no place in border
searches of vehicles.”74    
The Court, however, again left open the question of whether certain types of
inanimate object searches could be so offensive or intrusive as to require “reasonable
suspicion.”75  In upholding the suspicionless search of the gas tank, the Court noted
the factual difference between a search that ultimately reassembles what is examined
and those that use a potentially destructive drilling practice.76  Accordingly, while it
seems that a border search of an inanimate object does not invade a person’s privacy
interests per se or require an articulable level of suspicion, especially destructive
searches of property may require reasonable suspicion.77
Prolonged Detentions.  Prolonged detentions are seizures conducted in
order to either verify or dispel an agent’s suspicion that a traveler will introduce a
harmful agent into the country through alimentary canal smuggling.  In United States
v. Montoya de Hernandez, the Supreme Court was confronted with a passenger on
a flight from Bogota, Columbia, suspected of alimentary canal smuggling who
refused to consent to an x-ray examination.  In an attempt to verify or dispel their
suspicions,  Customs detained Ms. de Hernandez for over 16 hours and told her she
could not leave until she had excreted into a wastebasket.78  
The Court determined “that the detention of a traveler at the border, beyond the
scope of a routine Customs search and inspection, is justified at its inception if
Customs agents, considering all the facts surrounding the traveler and her trip,
reasonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling contraband in her alimentary
canal.”79  The Court concluded that it was reasonable to detain Ms. de Hernandez for
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936 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1991) (16 hour detention upheld after refusal to be x-rayed).
80 Esieke, 940 F.2d at 35. 
81 2 F.3d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 1993).  The court opined that a formal determination is not
necessary, rather, an informal presentation of the evidence supporting the government’s
suspicion before a neutral and detached judicial officer satisfies this requirement.
Furthermore, the court concluded that the failure to obtain such a judicial determination
within 48 hours shifts the burden to the government to demonstrate a bona fide emergency
justifying the extended detainment.
82 United States v. Chase, 503 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1974).
83 477 F.2d 608 (1st Cir. 1973).
84 Id.
85 E.g., United States v. Ogberaha, 771 F.2d 655, 657 (2d Cir. 1985) (vagina); United States
v. Pino, 729 F.2d 1357, 1358 (11th Cir. 1984) (rectum); Untied States v. Briones, 423 F.2d
742, 743 (5th Cir. 1970) (emetics).
the period of time necessary to either verify or dispel the suspicion of the agents in
these circumstances.  Courts have reasoned that “an otherwise permissible border
detention does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment simply because a detainee’s
intestinal fortitude leads to an unexpectedly long period of detention.”80  Notably
however, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Adekunle concluded that the
government must, within a reasonable time (generally within 48 hours), seek a
judicial determination that reasonable suspicion exists to detain a suspect for an
extended period of time.81 
Strip Searches. A strip search consists of removing one’s clothing either all
or in part to a state which would be offensive to the average person.  Accordingly,
reviewing courts generally require the presence of reasonable suspicion that a person
is concealing something illegal on the place to be searched in order for such a search
to be justified.  Because strip searches generally involve an embarrassing imposition
upon a traveler, it appears to be unreasonable to conduct such searches without
reasonable suspicion.82  Often, routine searches give rise to the reasonable suspicion
required to conduct strip searches.  For instance, in United States v. Flores, upon
discovering 600 small undeclared emerald stones  in the defendant’s pockets during
a routine search, Customs agents conducted a strip search and discovered an envelope
of narcotics.83  The court held that the prior discovery of the emeralds contrary to law
was clearly sufficient to meet the higher level of suspicion necessary to conduct the
strip search.84       
Body Cavity Searches.  Because government officials are well aware of
narcotic smuggling that is concealed in the body cavities of travelers, searches into
such cavities have become more common place.  Body cavity searches may include
inspections of the vagina, rectum, or the use of emetics.85  Because of the extreme
medical risks involved in internal drug smuggling, courts have determined that body
cavity searches do not require the advance procurement of a search warrant from a
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There is little case law on vaginal searches, however rectal search cases are arguably
analogous.
93 United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 1984) (asking whether an x-
ray is more intrusive than a cavity search because it will reveal more than the cavity search,
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magistrate.86  In general, a border official must “reasonably suspect” that an
individual is attempting to smuggle contraband inside his body for a court to justify
a body cavity search.87  Some courts historically required a “clear indication” (a
suggestion that is free from doubt) of alimentary canal smuggling due to the
significant intrusion beyond the body’s surface.88  However, ever since the Supreme
Court articulated a more general, but firm rejection of the “subtle verbal gradations”
being developed by courts of appeals to enunciate the Fourth Amendment standard
of reasonableness, courts have apparently been unwilling to adopt the “clear
indication” standard in the context of body cavity searches.89  Additionally, the
manner in which the body cavity search is conducted must also be reasonable in light
of the circumstances.  Generally, conduct that “shocks the conscience” is inherently
unreasonable.90  Such conduct has included that use of a stomach pump91 and could
potentially include medical procedures performed by nonmedical personnel.92 
X-Ray Searches.  X-ray searches have also been used at the border, instead
of, or in conjunction with, body cavity searches.  X-ray searches raise Fourth
Amendment concerns because they locate items where there is normally an
expectation of privacy.  Their level of intrusion has been questioned by courts
because they do not constitute an actual physical invasion but can pose harmful
medical effects.93  A question arises as to whether an involuntary x-ray search is more
akin to a strip search, and thus only requires a “reasonable suspicion,” for its
CRS-16
94 Id. at 1341.
95 Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d at 1346.
96 Id. at 1348.
97 Although some courts required a “clear indication” for x-ray searches, courts now
generally analogize x-rays with strip searches, and thus, only require reasonable suspicion.
Compare United States v. Ek, 676 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1982) (determining that while an
x-ray search may not be as humiliating as a strip search, “it is more intrusive since the search
is potentially harmful to the health of the suspect”) with United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d
832, 837 (8th Cir. 1986) (requiring reasonable suspicion for x-ray search); United States v.
Pino, 729 F.2d 1357, 1359 (11th Cir. 1984) (x-ray search equal to strip search). 
98 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report on the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States, p. 385 (Official Gov’t Ed. 2004).
99 Id. at 385-390.
application, or whether the intrusion is so great that it could potentially require a
greater level of suspicion. 
In examining this issue, the 11th Circuit in United States v. Vega-Barvo
determined that an x-ray search is no more intrusive than a strip search.94  The Vega-
Barvo court examined (1) the physical contact between the searcher and the person
searched; (2) the exposure of intimate body parts; and (3) the use of force.95  These
factors helped the court examine the level of intrusiveness endured by the defendant
and to ultimately conclude that the government agents, acting under a  reasonable
suspicion of illegal activity, properly detained and x-rayed the smuggler. The court
reasoned that x-rays do not require physical contact or usually expose intimate body
parts.  Further, the court noted that hospitals generally will not perform an x-ray
without a person’s consent.  The court also determined that “an x-ray is one of the
more dignified ways of searching the intestinal cavity.”96  In general, courts have
likened x-ray searches to strip searches, and thus,  “reasonable suspicion” is the level
of suspicion necessary to conduct an x-ray examination of a suspected alimentary
canal smuggler.97  
The 9/11 Commission Recommendations and Legislative
Action 
The 9/11 Commission made several recommendations and observations in its
Report for changes to our border security operations.  Most of these proposed
changes involve enhancing the detection of travelers that would pose us harm and
promoting cooperation between our federal agencies and with foreign governments.
The 9/11 Report emphasizes the importance of constraining and intercepting terrorist
travel by using better technology and training to detect falsified documents.98  To
accomplish this end, the Commission recommends: (1) creating a strategy to combine
terrorist intelligence, operations and law enforcement; (2) integrating the U.S. border
security system into a larger network of screening points; (3) implementing a
biometric entry-exit screening system; and (4) enhancing international cooperation,
particularly with Canada and Mexico, to raise global border security standards.99  The
108th Congress implemented some of these recommendations, as well as other
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Commission recommendations and observations, in the 9/11 Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) — a compromise piece of
legislation drawn from H.R. 10, the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act and
S. 2845, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 during conference.  
The 109th Congress is likely to revisit many of the issues addressed by the 9/11
Commission.  The 109th Congress may focus on Commission recommendations and
observations seemingly absent from the recently passed law.  For example, it appears
that the 9/11 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 does not
include specific language calling on the Secretary of DHS to integrate the U.S. border
security system into a larger network of screening points.  The 109th Congress is also
likely to be very involved in oversight issues, since it should be receiving a number
of reports and plans from various Departments on matters such as the implementation
of new border surveillance technologies, the biometric entry and exit data system,
and the enhanced training of border officials.  
The 109th Congress may also seek to enhance those recommendations passed
into law or address, what some would claim, are deficiencies in the 9/11 Intelligence
Reform law.  For example, provisions to complete a 14-mile border security fence
along the international boundary near San Diego, California, did not come to fruition
during consideration of the 9/11 Intelligence Reform law; however, the 109th
Congress successfully passed language to complete the fence in the FY2005
Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror,
and Tsunami Relief (P.L. 109-13).100  Other provisions in P.L. 109-13 call on DHS
to study the technology, equipment, and personnel needed to address security
vulnerabilities near our borders and to develop a pilot program to utilize or increase
the use of ground surveillance technologies (e.g., video cameras, sensor technology,
motion detectors) on both the northern and southern borders.  Border security and the
work of the  9/11 Commission will undoubtedly continue to be of interest to the 109th
Congress. 
The Minuteman Project
During April 2005, men and women from across the country gathered near the
border in Arizona to take part in a “citizens neighborhood watch” program called the
“Minuteman Project.”  The volunteers are supposed to set up observation posts and
report the movement illegal aliens to the U.S. Border Patrol.  According to the
Project’s website, the volunteers are directed “not to engage in argumentative or
hostile confrontation with any illegal alien.”101  The volunteers, according to the
website, are there to “assist” law enforcement in the conduct of their jobs, not to take
the law into their own hands.  Leaders of the Minuteman Project have stated that they
CRS-18
102 Ignacio Ibarra and Mary Vandeveire, “Minuteman” Expands Watch, Arizona Daily Star,
available at [http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249,600127623,00.html].
103 See, e.g.,  United Stats v. Malbrough, 922 F.2d  458 (8th Cir. 1990). In determining
whether a private citizen is an agent of the government, two critical factors are whether the
government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and whether the party
performing the questionable conduct performed the activity at the request of the government
and whether the government offered a reward.  Id. at 462.  Cf Proffitt v. Ridgway, 279 F.3d
503 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing ways a private citizen can be held liable under 42 U.S.C.
§1983 for acting under color of state law). 
104 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN §13-3112 (permit to carry concealed weapon); §13-404
(justification; self-defense); §13-3884 (arrest by private person); §13-410 (justification; use
of deadly force). 
105 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report on the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States, §12.4 at p. 383 (Official Gov’t Ed. 2004).
plan to continue the project until Congress commits to funding the “deployment of
the National Guard or military along the border” and  to expand the Project to Texas,
New Mexico, California, Idaho, and Michigan.102
The Minuteman Project could raise a number of legal issues due to its law
enforcement nature.  For instance, issues of liability and authority might arise should
a volunteer harm another person or conduct an unlawful activity.  The volunteers of
the Minuteman Project would unlikely be subject to the requirements and
prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment because they are not government actors.
However, it could be feasible to argue, depending on the circumstance, that a
volunteer might become a de facto government agent.  For example, should the
Border Patrol start directing and controlling the volunteers in their operations, it
might be argued that the Minuteman Project volunteers are acting as “agents” or
“instruments” of the Border Patrol, subject to similar constitutional restraints.103
These arguments notwithstanding, the volunteers are apparently acting as private
citizens, and are therefore subject to the laws of the state where they are operating.
Accordingly, at least for this initial phase, the volunteers had to follow Arizona state
law for such things as, carrying a firearm, defending themselves, making citizen
arrests (though they were not supposed to under the program), and using deadly
force.104  As the Minuteman Project expands to other states, compliance with similar
laws in each state will be necessary. 
Conclusion
Courts have consistently recognized the longstanding right of the United States
to protect itself by inspecting persons and property entering the country.  As an
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause and warrant requirements, the
routine border search will continue to play a significant role in border management.
The new terrorist threats of the 21st century, however, may necessitate the acquisition
and use of advanced detection devices or procedures. Implementation of these and
other border security measures might raise Fourth Amendment concerns, forcing
courts to reconsider the parameters of the border search exception — this time,
however, within the context of the “age of terrorism.”105
 
